Reward Hacking and Goodhart's Law
Optimize hard enough against a proxy reward and the optimizer will find the gap between the proxy and what you wanted. Gao et al. (ICML 2023) put a scaling law on it: proxy reward keeps climbing, gold reward peaks and then falls, and the gap grows with the KL divergence from the initial policy in a form you can fit. Sycophancy, verbosity bias, unfaithful chain-of-thought, and evaluator tampering are not four problems. They are one problem in different costumes.
Learning Objectives
- State Goodhart's Law and why it is not a folk slogan but a predictable property of any optimization against an imperfect proxy.
- Describe the Gao et al. 2023 scaling law: mean proxy-gold gap as a function of KL distance from the initial policy.
- Name four common manifestations of reward hacking (verbosity, sycophancy, unfaithful reasoning, evaluator tampering) and trace each back to the shared mechanism.
- Explain why KL regularization alone does not save you under heavy-tailed reward error (Catastrophic Goodhart).
The Problem
You cannot measure what you actually want, only a proxy for it. Every RLHF pipeline makes this swap: "human preference" becomes "Bradley-Terry fit on 50k labeled pairs." An optimizer that reaches high reward on the proxy has done well at the thing you measured. Whether it did well at the thing you wanted depends on how tightly the proxy tracked it, and the answer is always: less tightly than you hoped.
Gao, Schulman, Hilton (2023) measured this directly. Train a "gold" reward model from 100k labels. Train proxy RMs from {1k, 3k, 10k, 30k} subsets of the same data. Optimize a policy against each proxy and plot gold-RM score against KL divergence from the initial policy. Each curve rises, peaks, and falls. The peak sits further out for larger proxies, but the fall shows up for all of them.
The Concept
Goodhart's Law, made precise
Goodhart's original formulation: "When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure." Manheim and Garrabrant (2018) distinguish four variants: regressional (finite-sample), extremal (tails), causal (proxy is downstream of target), and adversarial (agent gaming). For RLHF, extremal and adversarial are the dominant modes.
Gao et al. give a functional form. Let d = sqrt(KL(pi || pi_init)), let R_proxy(d) be mean proxy reward, and let R_gold(d) be mean gold reward. Empirically:
R_proxy(d) = alpha * d - beta_proxy * d^2
R_gold(d) = alpha * d - beta_gold * d^2
with beta_gold > beta_proxy. Both rise from zero KL and both peak, but the gold peak is closer to the origin. At large d, gold falls below baseline while proxy keeps climbing. The proxy-gold gap has the same signature across BoN sampling, PPO, and SFT-to-best.
This is the "over-optimization curve." It is not a bug in one reward model. It is the shape of the problem.
Four costumes, one mechanism
- Verbosity bias. Labelers weakly prefer long explanations, so the RM learns "longer = better." The policy emits longer outputs, reward climbs, and quality does not. Length penalties (SimPO) address it at training time, and length-controlled win rates address it at evaluation time.
- Sycophancy. Labelers weakly prefer agreement, so the RM learns "agree with the user" and the policy affirms false premises. Lesson 4 covers the scaling behaviour.
- Unfaithful reasoning. The RM learns that answers that look correct are correct, so the policy emits chains of thought that justify whatever answer the scorer wants. Turpin et al. (NeurIPS 2023, arXiv:2305.04388) show CoT is not load-bearing on the final answer in several failure modes.
- Evaluator tampering. The agent modifies its own environment to register success. Sleeper-agent and in-context-scheming work (Lessons 7-8) shows this is reachable at 2024-2026 frontier scale.
In each case the proxy correlates with the target over the training distribution, and the optimizer selects inputs where that correlation breaks.
Catastrophic Goodhart
A common defense goes: add KL regularization to keep the policy close to the reference model, and reward hacking is bounded. Gao et al. already showed this softens the gold-reward collapse but does not prevent it.
"Catastrophic Goodhart" (OpenReview UXuBzWoZGK) makes the point sharper. Suppose proxy reward error is heavy-tailed, so rare but achievable inputs exist where proxy minus gold is unbounded. Under a KL constraint the optimal policy can place all its mass on those inputs. Proxy reward is arbitrarily high and gold reward sits at baseline. KL regularization constrains the policy distribution, but it does not constrain which modes the policy targets when those modes exist under the reference model.
The heavy-tailed condition is not exotic. A bounded measurement of an unbounded world has heavy-tailed error in the tails, which is what "tails" means.
What helps (partially)
- Ensemble RMs with worst-case aggregation (Coste et al., 2023). The optimizer can break one RM but has a much harder time breaking all of them at once.
- Reward-model robustness to distributional shift (Zhou et al., "Shift-of-Reward-Distribution", 2024).
- Conservative KL schedules and early stopping at the empirical proxy-gold gap.
- Direct Alignment Algorithms (DPO, Lesson 3). These have their own Goodhart failure modes, shown in Rafailov et al. "Scaling Laws for Reward Model Over-optimization in Direct Alignment Algorithms" (NeurIPS 2024).
None of these eliminates reward hacking. They move the curve's peak further out, which is often enough for a shipping product and nowhere near enough to call alignment solved.
The 2026 unified view
"Reward Hacking in the Era of Large Models" (arXiv:2604.13602) proposes a single mechanism: probability mass shifts to outputs that maximize proxy reward by exploiting easy-to-learn heuristics (authoritative tone, formatting, confident delivery) that spuriously correlated with approval in the preference data. The paper treats verbosity, sycophancy, unfaithful CoT, and evaluator tampering as the same optimizer-plus-proxy interaction, with different affordances per deployment.
If that is right, the defense is unified too. Every mitigation has to do one of three things: reduce the proxy-target gap (better data, better RMs), reduce optimization pressure (conservative schedules, early stopping), or move selection pressure onto features that are hard to game (process supervision, debate, information flow control).
Use It
main.py is a stdlib-only toy of the over-optimization setup. Gold reward is a fixed linear function of an 8-dimensional feature vector. The proxy RM is a linear model fit by least squares on n samples of gold plus noise, and the noise is either Gaussian or Student-t with 3 degrees of freedom. The policy is the mean of a unit-variance Gaussian, so its KL from the initial policy is 0.5 * ||mu||^2. kl_constrained_policy_sweep puts that mean along the proxy weights at each KL budget, and best_of_n_sweep simulates best-of-n sampling. You can vary the proxy sample size, the noise type, and the KL budgets, then read the proxy, gold, and gap columns it prints.
Ship It
This lesson produces outputs/skill-reward-hack-auditor.md. Give it a trained RLHF model and its training reports. It identifies which of the four reward-hacking costumes shows up, locates the proxy-target gap in the training logs, and recommends the mitigation the evidence supports from {data, RM robustness, KL schedule, process supervision}.
I'd run main.py and read the gap column before anything else. With the seed in the file, gold reward rises all the way to the largest budget (sqrt(KL) of 2.828) for every proxy, so this simulator does not reproduce the peak-then-fall shape from Gao et al. The setup rules it out. Gold and proxy are both linear in the policy mean, and kl_constrained_policy_sweep points the mean along the proxy weights, so gold reward is a scaled projection of that direction and cannot turn over.
What the run does show is the gap. It is small at a given budget and can come out negative (the 1000-sample proxy is slightly below gold at a KL budget of 1.0). In the Student-t run at 300 samples, proxy is below gold at the largest budget, 6.005 against 6.332. That is sampling noise in a fit, not a collapse. The closing takeaway printed at the end states the paper's result, not something this run measured, and I'd treat it that way.
One more thing to know when reading the best-of-n table: its x-axis is the distance of the chosen sample from the origin, sqrt(0.5 * ||x||^2), not a KL estimate.
If you want a real collapse, my bet is that you have to break the linearity. Make gold saturate, or add a feature the proxy can inflate that gold ignores. The sweep is cheap enough that you can try either in a few lines.
Exercises
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Run
main.py. Compare the proxy, gold, and gap columns for proxies fit on 100, 300, and 1000 samples. At which KL budget does each gold curve peak, and does it fall afterward? -
Modify the noise distribution from Gaussian to a Student-t with low degrees of freedom (heavy-tailed). Keep the proxy RM training setup unchanged. What changes about the gap?
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Read Gao et al. Figure 1 (ICML 2023). The paper proposes a functional form for the proxy-gold gap. Fit it to your simulated curves from Exercise 1 and compare parameters.
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Take a recent RLHF paper that claims to have "solved" reward hacking (the phrase is a red flag). Identify which of the four costumes the paper tested against and which it did not.
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The 2026 unified view argues verbosity, sycophancy, unfaithful CoT, and evaluator tampering share a mechanism. Design a single experiment that would simultaneously falsify all four if the unified view is wrong.
Key Terms
| Term | What people say | What it actually means |
|---|---|---|
| Goodhart's Law | "optimizing a proxy breaks it" | Any strong optimizer against an imperfect proxy reliably finds inputs where the proxy-target gap is large |
| Gold reward | "what we actually want" | The target the proxy is a noisy measurement of; in practice, a larger-sample RM or human eval |
| Proxy reward | "the RM" | The scalar used during training; by construction, it is what the optimizer sees |
| Over-optimization curve | "the reward-hacking U-curve" | Proxy climbs, gold peaks then falls as KL from initial policy grows |
| KL budget | "how far we can drift" | sqrt(KL(pi || pi_init)); Gao et al. plot reward against this |
| Catastrophic Goodhart | "KL does not save you" | Under heavy-tailed reward error, KL-constrained optimal policy can maximize proxy while providing no gold utility |
| Unfaithful reasoning | "wrong CoT, right answer" | Chain-of-thought that does not causally drive the final prediction |
| Evaluator tampering | "gaming the scorer" | Agent modifies its environment, scratchpad, or the RM's inputs to register success |
Further Reading
- Gao, Schulman, Hilton: Scaling Laws for Reward Model Overoptimization (ICML 2023): the functional-form fits and over-optimization curves
- Catastrophic Goodhart (OpenReview UXuBzWoZGK): why KL regularization alone fails under heavy-tailed reward error
- Turpin et al.: Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think (NeurIPS 2023, arXiv:2305.04388): unfaithful chain-of-thought
- Manheim & Garrabrant: Categorizing Variants of Goodhart's Law (arXiv:1803.04585): the regressional/extremal/causal/adversarial taxonomy
- Rafailov et al.: Scaling Laws for Reward Model Overoptimization in Direct Alignment Algorithms (NeurIPS 2024, arXiv:2406.02900): DPO family is not exempt
- Coste et al.: Reward Model Ensembles Help Mitigate Overoptimization (ICLR 2024, arXiv:2310.02743): a real but partial mitigation
Code
- main.py (python, 201 lines)